

Is this Encoder Mine? On Stealing and Defending Self-Supervised Encoders

Adam Dziedzic

Deep Learning: Classics and Trends (DLCT)

November 11th, 2022



VECTOR
INSTITUTE



UNIVERSITY OF
TORONTO

Annotate Data Using Machine Learning APIs






Adam Dziedzic, Muhammad Ahmad Kaleem, Yu Shen Lu, Nicolas Papernot *"Increasing the Cost of Model Extraction with Calibrated Proof of Work"* [ICLR 2022 **SPOTLIGHT**].


Machine Learning
API

Query


Answer




Train Models for Machine Learning Services



Collect & Label Data



Tune Hyper-parameters






Run on GPU/TPU/CPU


Machine Learning
API

Query

Answer





Train Models for Machine Learning Services





Collect & Label Data

\$ 12M GPT-3



Tune Hyper-parameters






Run on GPU/TPU/CPU


Machine Learning
API

Query


Answer




Stealing Machine Learning Models



Collect & Label Data





Tune Hyper-parameters



Run on GPU/TPU/CPU

\$ 12M GPT-3



Machine Learning
API

Query


Answer




[Shankar et al. 2020]

Model Stealing - ranked among the most severe attacks against ML

Threat of Model Stealing




-  's incentives:
1. Steal model with a lower training cost
 2. Reconnaissance for launching further attacks

Degrees of Access to Your Knowledge



Query
Access

Machine Learning
API





Obtain high-quality outputs:
light data collection + tuning

Degrees of Access to Your Knowledge



Degrees of Access to Your Knowledge



Degrees of Access to Your Knowledge

Query
Access


Data
Access

Model
Access

Machine Learning
API



Private
Labeled Data



Victim
Model


Copy
Fine-tuning
Distillation

Query


Answer
(logits, labels)



Unlabeled Data



Stolen
Model



Stolen
Model




Stolen
Model

Obtain high-quality outputs:
light data collection + tuning


Skip data collection
and labeling

Least amount of effort


Supervised Learning API





Supervised Learning API



Supervised vs Self-Supervised Learning API



Supervised vs Self-Supervised Learning API



Threat of Stealing Self-Supervised Encoders

Practical and Growing Threat

ML Service Providers have already commenced offering SSL Encoders over paid APIs.

SSL is becoming the dominant paradigm for important ML domains like Vision and NLP.

co:here

Cohere Raises \$40 Million in Series A Financing to Make Natural Language Processing Safe and Accessible to Any Business

Build next-gen apps with OpenAI's powerful models.

OpenAI's API provides access to GPT-3, which performs a wide variety of natural language tasks, and Codex, which translates natural language to code.

[GET STARTED](#)


[READ DOCUMENTATION](#)




clarifai exposes a visual recognition model for returning 768-dimensional numerical vectors that represent the items in images and video.

Efficient Attacks & Inadequate Defenses

1. Attacks against SSL models are query efficient: number of stealing queries $< 1/5^{\text{th}}$ number of training data points.
2. Existing defenses against stealing supervised models are inadequate for SSL models.



Siamese Framework for Stealing Encoders



Adam Dziedzic, Nikita Dhawan, Muhammad Ahmad Kaleem, Jonas Guan, Nicolas Papernot
"On the Difficulty of Defending Self-Supervised Learning against Model Extraction" [ICML 2022].

Impact of Loss Functions on Encoder Stealing

| | CIFAR10 Victim | | SVHN Victim | |
|------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Loss\Downstream Task | STL10 | CIFAR10 | STL10 | CIFAR10 |
| <i>Victim baseline</i> | 67.9 | 79.0 | 50.6 | 57.5 |
| Mean Squared Error | 64.8 | 75.5 | 46.3 | 51.2 |
| InfoNCE | 64.6 | 75.5 | 50.4 | 56.3 |
| SoftNN | 67.1 | 76.9 | 44.6 | 48.4 |
| SupCon (uses labels) | 63.1 | 78.5 | 33.9 | 42.3 |
| Wasserstein | 50.8 | 63.9 | 40.1 | 46.4 |
| Barlow | 26.6 | 26.9 | 16.3 | 17.9 |

Impact of Loss Functions on Encoder Stealing

| | CIFAR10 Victim | | SVHN Victim | |
|-----------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Loss\Downstream Task | STL10 | CIFAR10 | STL10 | CIFAR10 |
| <i>Victim baseline</i> | 67.9 | 79.0 | 50.6 | 57.5 |
| Mean Squared Error | 64.8 | 75.5 | 46.3 | 51.2 |
| InfoNCE | 64.6 | 75.5 | 50.4 | 56.3 |
| SoftNN | 67.1 | 76.9 | 44.6 | 48.4 |
| SupCon (uses labels) | 63.1 | 78.5 | 33.9 | 42.3 |
| Wasserstein | 50.8 | 63.9 | 40.1 | 46.4 |
| Barlow | 26.6 | 26.9 | 16.3 | 17.9 |

Contrastive losses perform the best for training & stealing encoders

Stealing a Pre-trained ImageNet Encoder


| | | Downstream Task | | | | |
|---|-------------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| # Queries | Data for Stealing | CIFAR10 | CIFAR100 | STL10 | SVHN | F-MNIST |
| <i>Victim ImageNet Encoder Baseline</i> | | 90.33 | 71.45 | 94.9 | 79.39 | 91.9 |
| 60K | CIFAR10 | 83.3 | 57.0 | 71.2 | 73.8 | 90.7 |
| 50K | SVHN | 73.3 | 47.1 | 58.2 | 78.8 | 90.4 |
| 250K | SVHN | 77.1 | 52.6 | 61.9 | 80.2 | 91.4 |
| 50K | ImageNet | 65.2 | 35.1 | 64.9 | 62.1 | 88.5 |
| 250K | ImageNet | 80.0 | 57.0 | 85.8 | 71.5 | 90.2 |

Stealing a Pre-trained ImageNet Encoder

| | | Downstream Task | | | | |
|---|-------------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| # Queries | Data for Stealing | CIFAR10 | CIFAR100 | STL10 | SVHN | F-MNIST |
| <i>Victim ImageNet Encoder Baseline</i> | | 90.33 | 71.45 | 94.9 | 79.39 | 91.9 |
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number of stealing queries $< 1/5^{\text{th}}$ number of training data points


Defenses against Model Stealing




Poison Attacker's Objective

Prediction Poisoning [Orekondy et al. 2020]

Defenses against Model Stealing



Passive




Poison Attacker's Objective

Prediction Poisoning [Orekondy et al. 2020]


Detect Attack & Stop Responding

PRADA [Juuti et al. 2019]

Defenses against Model Stealing



Passive



Poison Attacker's Objective

Prediction Poisoning [Orekondy et al. 2020]

Detect Attack & Stop Responding

PRADA [Juuti et al. 2019]

Pro-Active




Proof-of-Work

Calibrated Proof-of-Work with PATE




Differential
Privacy

Defenses against Model Stealing



Passive



Poison Attacker's Objective

Prediction Poisoning [Orekondy et al. 2020]

Detect Attack & Stop Responding

PRADA [Juuti et al. 2019]

Pro-Active




Proof-of-Work

Calibrated Proof-of-Work with PATE




Differential
Privacy




Resolve Model Ownership

Dataset Inference [Maini et al. 2021]

Embed Rotation Task to Defend Encoders




Transferability of the Rotation Watermark



Intuition behind Dataset Inference

Train


Test




Supervised

Intuition behind Dataset Inference

Supervised




Self-Supervised




Stolen / Victim encoders

Independent encoders


Dataset Inference on Victim Encoder




Steal the Victim Encoder




Ownership Resolution: Stolen Encoder



Ownership Resolution: Independent Encoder



Ownership Resolution in Dataset Inference



Adam Dziedzic, Haonan Duan, Muhammad Ahmad Kaleem, Nikita Dhawan, Jonas Guan, Yannis Cattan, Franziska Boenisch, Nicolas Papernot "Dataset Inference for Self-Supervised Models" [NeurIPS 2022].

Empirical Evaluation

p -value $< 5e-2$ denotes a stolen/victim encoder, otherwise the t -test is inconclusive and the encoder is marked as independent

| <i>Victim's private data:</i> | | <i>CIFAR10</i> | | | <i>SVHN</i> | | | <i>ImageNet</i> | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------|----------------|----------|-------------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------------|----------|-------------|
| Encoder | Obfuscate | D | p-value | $\Delta\mu$ | D | p-value | $\Delta\mu$ | D | p-value | $\Delta\mu$ |
| f_v | N/A | CIFAR10 | 4.52e-17 | 10.73 | SVHN | 9.69e-227 | 19.93 | ImageNet | 4.18e-36 | 28.39 |
| | | SVHN | 3.97e-2 | 3.04 | SVHN | 1.05e-75 | 11.75 | SVHN | 3.33e-4 | 14.79 |
| f_s | N/A | CIFAR10 | 8.73e-7 | 5.09 | CIFAR10 | 1.19e-17 | 6.22 | CIFAR10 | 1.47e-4 | 10.19 |
| | | STL10 | 1.04e-2 | 3.42 | STL10 | 1.65e-11 | 4.32 | STL10 | 1.09e-4 | 15.13 |
| | | ImageNet | 6.34e-3 | 3.47 | ImageNet | 5.32e-8 | 5.52 | ImageNet | 3.14e-5 | 16.53 |
| f_s | <i>Shuffle</i> | CIFAR10 | 1.72e-6 | 4.98 | CIFAR10 | 4.79e-16 | 5.38 | CIFAR10 | 6.72e-4 | 10.21 |
| | <i>Pad</i> | CIFAR10 | 3.34e-6 | 4.84 | CIFAR10 | 7.81e-18 | 7.98 | CIFAR10 | 2.31e-3 | 7.23 |
| | <i>Transform</i> | CIFAR10 | 6.81e-7 | 5.11 | CIFAR10 | 5.32e-15 | 5.21 | CIFAR10 | 8.45e-3 | 8.98 |
| f_i | N/A | CIFAR100 | 3.67e-1 | -0.37 | CIFAR100 | 2.13e-1 | 0.68 | CIFAR100 | 7.89e-2 | 4.56 |
| | | SVHN | 2.96e-1 | 0.98 | CIFAR10 | 3.56e-1 | 0.84 | SVHN | 5.42e-1 | 0.69 |

Empirical Evaluation

p -value $< 5e-2$ denotes a stolen/victim encoder, otherwise the t -test is inconclusive and the encoder is marked as independent

| <i>Victim's private data:</i> | | <i>CIFAR10</i> | | | <i>SVHN</i> | | | <i>ImageNet</i> | | |
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| Encoder | Obfuscate | D | p-value | $\Delta\mu$ | D | p-value | $\Delta\mu$ | D | p-value | $\Delta\mu$ |
| f_v | N/A | CIFAR10 | 4.52e-17 | 10.73 | SVHN | 9.69e-227 | 19.93 | ImageNet | 4.18e-36 | 28.39 |
| f_s | N/A | SVHN | 3.97e-2 | 3.04 | SVHN | 1.05e-75 | 11.75 | SVHN | 3.33e-4 | 14.79 |
| | | CIFAR10 | 8.73e-7 | 5.09 | CIFAR10 | 1.19e-17 | 6.22 | CIFAR10 | 1.47e-4 | 10.19 |
| | | STL10 | 1.04e-2 | 3.42 | STL10 | 1.65e-11 | 4.32 | STL10 | 1.09e-4 | 15.13 |
| | | ImageNet | 6.34e-3 | 3.47 | ImageNet | 5.32e-8 | 5.52 | ImageNet | 3.14e-5 | 16.53 |
| f_s | <i>Shuffle</i> | CIFAR10 | 1.72e-6 | 4.98 | CIFAR10 | 4.79e-16 | 5.38 | CIFAR10 | 6.72e-4 | 10.21 |
| | <i>Pad</i> | CIFAR10 | 3.34e-6 | 4.84 | CIFAR10 | 7.81e-18 | 7.98 | CIFAR10 | 2.31e-3 | 7.23 |
| | <i>Transform</i> | CIFAR10 | 6.81e-7 | 5.11 | CIFAR10 | 5.32e-15 | 5.21 | CIFAR10 | 8.45e-3 | 8.98 |
| f_i | N/A | CIFAR100 | 3.67e-1 | -0.37 | CIFAR100 | 2.13e-1 | 0.68 | CIFAR100 | 7.89e-2 | 4.56 |
| | | SVHN | 2.96e-1 | 0.98 | CIFAR10 | 3.56e-1 | 0.84 | SVHN | 5.42e-1 | 0.69 |

Empirical Evaluation: Ownership Resolution

Obfuscations - the representation modified by an adversary:

(1) Shuffle the elements in the representation vectors, **(2) Pad** with or add constant values at random positions, and **(3) Apply a linear Transform**.


| <i>Victim's private data:</i> | | <i>CIFAR10</i> | | | <i>SVHN</i> | | | <i>ImageNet</i> | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------|----------------|----------|-------------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------------|----------|-------------|
| Encoder | Obfuscate | <i>D</i> | p-value | $\Delta\mu$ | <i>D</i> | p-value | $\Delta\mu$ | <i>D</i> | p-value | $\Delta\mu$ |
| f_v | N/A | CIFAR10 | 4.52e-17 | 10.73 | SVHN | 9.69e-227 | 19.93 | ImageNet | 4.18e-36 | 28.39 |
| | | SVHN | 3.97e-2 | 3.04 | SVHN | 1.05e-75 | 11.75 | SVHN | 3.33e-4 | 14.79 |
| f_s | N/A | CIFAR10 | 8.73e-7 | 5.09 | CIFAR10 | 1.19e-17 | 6.22 | CIFAR10 | 1.47e-4 | 10.19 |
| | | STL10 | 1.04e-2 | 3.42 | STL10 | 1.65e-11 | 4.32 | STL10 | 1.09e-4 | 15.13 |
| | | ImageNet | 6.34e-3 | 3.47 | ImageNet | 5.32e-8 | 5.52 | ImageNet | 3.14e-5 | 16.53 |
| f_s | <i>Shuffle</i> | CIFAR10 | 1.72e-6 | 4.98 | CIFAR10 | 4.79e-16 | 5.38 | CIFAR10 | 6.72e-4 | 10.21 |
| | <i>Pad</i> | CIFAR10 | 3.34e-6 | 4.84 | CIFAR10 | 7.81e-18 | 7.98 | CIFAR10 | 2.31e-3 | 7.23 |
| | <i>Transform</i> | CIFAR10 | 6.81e-7 | 5.11 | CIFAR10 | 5.32e-15 | 5.21 | CIFAR10 | 8.45e-3 | 8.98 |
| f_i | N/A | CIFAR100 | 3.67e-1 | -0.37 | CIFAR100 | 2.13e-1 | 0.68 | CIFAR100 | 7.89e-2 | 4.56 |
| | | SVHN | 2.96e-1 | 0.98 | CIFAR10 | 3.56e-1 | 0.84 | SVHN | 5.42e-1 | 0.69 |

Measuring Quality of Stolen Encoders

$S(\cdot, f_v)$ and $C(\cdot, f_v)$ represent the Mutual Information Score and Cosine Similarity


| Score | Number of Queries | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|-------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| | 500 | 5K | 7K | 8K | 9K | 10K | 20K | 30K | 50K |
| $S(\cdot, f_v)$ | 0.00 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.53 | 0.57 | 0.69 | 0.92 | 0.93 | 0.94 |
| $C(\cdot, f_v)$ | 0.24 | 0.40 | 0.46 | 0.47 | 0.49 | 0.52 | 0.58 | 0.63 | 0.69 |
| p-values | 6.89e-1 | 3.51e-1 | 4.72e-1 | 9.87e-2 | 6.23e-2 | 5.82e-3 | 2.31e-7 | 2.11e-10 | 1.19e-17 |
| | 5K | 10K | 20K | 30K | 40K | 50K | 100K | 200K | 250K |
| $S(\cdot, f_v)$ | 0.62 | 0.79 | 0.79 | 0.81 | 0.82 | 0.84 | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.86 |
| $C(\cdot, f_v)$ | 0.25 | 0.32 | 0.33 | 0.36 | 0.35 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.40 | 0.39 |
| p-values | 1.23e-1 | 7.91e-2 | 6.53e-2 | 8.98e-2 | 4.52e-2 | 1.10e-2 | 2.11e-3 | 1.11e-3 | 3.33e-4 |

Conclusions




High Performance of Stolen Self-Supervised Encoders

Conclusions




High Performance of Stolen Self-Supervised Encoders




Watermarking-based Defense


Conclusions



High Performance of Stolen Self-Supervised Encoders




Watermarking-based Defense




Reactive Dataset Inference Defense


Conclusions




High Performance of Stolen Self-Supervised Encoders



Reactive Dataset Inference
Defense



Watermarking-based
Defense



Design New
Attacks & Defenses

Thank you

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