

Is My Prediction Arbitrary? Measuring Self-Consistency in Fair Classification

A. Feder Cooper

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Presenting work in collaboration with **Katherine Lee** (Google DeepMind), **Solon Barocas** (Microsoft Research & Cornell), **Christopher De Sa** (Cornell), **Siddhartha Sen** (Microsoft Research), **Baobao Zhang** (Syracuse)

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Empirics tend to be secondary

Instead of theory, we focus on empirical methods, provide substantial empirical analysis

We want future fairness researchers to use methods like ours because they give more reliable evaluation of

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- 2) problems the models are supposed to be predicting

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
The answer turns out to be extremely simple

Could do more sophisticated things from the lit on model uncertainty, but in this setting (fair classification), we don't need to https://afed

Training 10 different logistic regression models on COMPAS using bootstrapping


(Dataset used to predict whether or not a person will commit a crime; used to determine bail)

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
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
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
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We turn this picture into a metric (*self-consistency*) to capture *arbitrariness*

We quantify and mitigate arbitrariness in fair classification

Our contributions

Quantifying arbitrariness via self-consistency

Developing an algorithm that **abstains** from making arbitrary predictions

Running a large-scale empirical study on the role of *arbitrariness* in *fair classification*

Packaging a large-scale dataset (won't get into this, but at the end will explain why)

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
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
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
self-consistency
$$= 1 - \frac{2B_0B_1}{B(B-1)}$$
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Defined in terms of # of bootstrap replicates B



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


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


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


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


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


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Ind. 1: $B_0 = 0, B_1 = 10$ Ind. 2: $B_0 = 5, B_1 = 5$


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Interpretation

a value on [~0.5, 1]



A metric: Self-consistency


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
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
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
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
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does <u>not</u> depend on dataset labels y (traditional fairness metrics do)









COMPAS, random forests, B=101 (mean +/- STD over 10 trials)

About 20% of the COMPAS test set looks approximately like Ind. 2







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
Their predictions are *arbitrary*

(mean +/- STD over 10 trials)





systematic arbitrariness



systematic arbitrariness (actually happens rarely in practice)


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
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
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
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simple ensembling (ensembles common model types in fair classification)
super ensembling (ensembles simple ensemble models, i.e., nested ensembles)

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Pretty shocking insights about the current state of fair classification research

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We are going to go through one example, looking at How self-consistency changes

The effects on common error-based fairness metrics (since these are standard measurements in the field)


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
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
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Simple ensembling Can abstain a lot

Super ensembling Brings down the curve \rightarrow has higher self-consistency

Abstains less




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
Both

Improve overall self-consistency by abstaining




Fairness metrics


Examine false positive rate disparities



	Baseline
$\Delta \mathbf{F} \hat{\mathbf{P}} \mathbf{R}$	$2.1\pm0.0\%$
FPRNW	$14.7\pm1.3\%$
FPRW	$12.6\pm1.3\%$



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
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COMPAS, logistic regression, B=101 (mean +/- STD over 10 trials)

Expected error, which is not alone attainable by a single model (averages computed over underlying 1010 models)

Fairness metrics


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We are able to obtain this result with simple ensemble models



	Baseline	Simple	Super
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FPR _{NW}	$14.7\pm1.3\%$	$11.4\pm1.0\%$	$12.9\pm.8\%$
FPRW	$12.6\pm1.3\%$	$8.4\pm1.0\%$	$11.1\pm.6\%$

COMPAS, logistic regression, B=101 (mean +/- STD over 10 trials)

We are able to obtain this result with super ensemble models

Fairness metrics

Examine false positive rate disparities

We yield results that are very close-to-fair (<2% disparity in FPR) (and **super** abstains <5%)

Probability	1.0 - 0.8 - 0.6 - 0.4 - 0.2 -	Simple NW W		per NW W	к = . 7	5	
	0.0-[0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0
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
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And we haven't run any algorithmic fairness method!

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Datasets:

- (South) German Credit
- COMPAS
- Old Adult

Datasets:

- (South) German Credit
- COMPAS
- Old Adult
- Taiwan Credit

Datasets:

- (South) German Credit
- COMPAS
- Old Adult
- Taiwan Credit
- New Adult (race, sex)
 - Income
 - Public Coverage
 - Employment

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... without using a single field-standard theory-backed technique that aims to improve fairness

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Our results that much theory work in the field misses this point. Rigorous empirics cast doubt on the practical usefulness of prior theoretical formulation choices